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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTA C. SCHAUMBERG,
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case NO. 920865-CA
THOMAS J. SCHAUMBERG,
Defendant/Appellant.
Defendant/Appellant, Thomas J. Schaumberg, respectfully
files the following Brief in Reply to the Brief filed by Appellee
in this matter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT RELIEVED FROM ITS
RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE FINDINGS REGARDING
MRS. SCHAUMBERG'S NEEDS IN THIS CASE.
Appellee acknowledges that the Court must make findings
regarding the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse, as well as her ability to produce income.

Then she

suggests that the requirement should be waived in this case
because the facts support only a finding in favor of the $800.00
award.

In so doing, Mrs. Schaumberg ignores the inconsistencies

in her own testimony, and the testimony elicited on cross-

examination which does not support the award of alimony and
certainly draws into question just what her needs are.
In so doing, Mrs. Schaumberg suggests that it is not
necessary for the Court to make a finding regarding her needs in
awarding her alimony.

The award, in and of itself, should be

sufficient to suggest that her needs require that sum of monthly
support.

If that were the case, then it would never be a

requirement to make a separate finding regarding the recipient
spouse's needs.

Simply the award would be enough.

However, the requirement of specific, understandable, and
defensible findings is necessary so that the appellate courts can
review: (1) the appropriateness of the award, and (2) whether it
is supported by the evidence.
For instance, in this case, Plaintiff ignores the fact that
her estimate of housing and housing related expenses was based
upon her experience in living in the large family home which had
been sold by the time of the trial.

(Transcript pages 4 3 - 44)

Furthermore, Plaintiff had done no investigation into what her
expenses would be following the sale of the home for items such
as utilities, insurance and the like.

(Transcript pages 4 3 - 4 4 )

The marital home was a five bedroom home with a complete basement
which was clearly exceeded the needs of the wife.

(Transcript

page 44)
Mrs. Schaumberg7s suggestion that she was not familiar with
the household expenses during the course of the litigation in
this case is unbelievable.

She maintained the household finances
-2-

and paid the bills up until shortly before the separation of the
parties.

(Transcript page 46, line 15)

The Plaintiff's estimate of medical expenses are not medical
expenses at all, rather anticipated expenses for medical
insurance assuming that she is not working and not covered by
work related health insurance.1

The Plaintiff testified,

regarding the availability of medical insurance through
employment, Answer: "No.

I get work, and I have medical

benefits, yes, but if I don't, I have to use health insurance."
(Transcript page 44, lines 8 - 9 )
The Plaintiff could not adequately explain the increase
between her pre-trial declaration of expenses and those that she
relied upon at trial.

(Transcript page 49)

The Plaintiff

testified that she required $160.00 per month for school when she
was not enrolled in school.

Subsequently, she did enroll, but

was taking only one class.
In fact, throughout these proceedings, the Plaintiff has
testified variously about her living expenses with a differential
of over $900.00 per month.

Mrs. Schaumberg suggests now that her

trial testimony is all the more credible because the figure at
trial was $900.00 less than what she testified to at times during
the pendency of the case.

In fact, this is one of the principal

In fact, the Plaintiff had been working during the pendency of the
case, substantially throughout the marriage, is able bodied, and was underemployed hence the court's imputation of full-time income to the Plaintiff.
The imputed income was based upon the testimony of the Defendant's expert
employment consultant. (Transcript pages 6 4 - 7 8 )
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reasons that the Court should make findings in this case
regarding her needs.

Her testimony is not credible.

Her trial

testimony was no more reliable than her, albeit more inflated
estimates made at other times in the case.
The fact that the Plaintiff "did not realize how expensive
life was" (Plaintiff's Brief, page 7, and Transcript page 53,
line 14), would seem to suggest that her testimony at trial would
reflect a higher level of need, not less.

This was not the case.

The Plaintiff's reliance on Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d
841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) is misplaced.

That case does not

justify an absent finding as to wife's needs as she suggests in
this case.

Rather, that case was remanded because the findings

were inadequate.

There it was required that the Court do more

than simply state that "The [husband] has the ability to pay."
Similarly, in this case the Court must do more than simply state
that the wife needs a particular sum for alimony.

This is

especially so where her own testimony is unreliable on its fact.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ALL SOURCES
OF INCOME AVAILABLE TO THE RECIPIENT SPOUSE
WHEN AWARDING ALIMONY.
The Plaintiff argues that the Court need not consider all of
her sources of income because this case warrants income
equalization.

First of all, the Court did not make that finding.

Secondly, income equalization does not relieve the Court from
making adequate findings as to the income available to the
receiving spouse.

-4-

While it may be that this is an appropriate case for
alimony, the amount of alimony should not be determined simply by
suggesting that all income shall be equalized.

The Plaintiff

does not fit the so called "equalization" profile as suggested.
Typically, significant alimony or equalized income has been
awarded in cases of thirty of more years of marriage, where the
recipient spouse has been out of the work force for many years,
where the recipient spouse has stayed home and raised a family,
where the recipient spouse is minimally trained and not likely to
obtain significant employment.

(See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d

1072 (Utah 1985) [permanent alimony awarded to unskilled
housewife in her mid-50's who possesses few marketable job skills
and who has little hope of retraining after 29 years of
marriage]; Anderson v. Anderson, 757, P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) [34 year marriage involving housewife spouse who has no
outside work skills]; Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) [27 year marriage with spouse who now is working only parttime and who had a disabled minor child]; Howell v. Howell, 806
P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) [receiving spouse was
approximately 50 years old, had minimal marketable job skills,
had spent most of the 3 0 plus years of the parties' marriage
raising and caring for their five children in the home]; Rasband
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) [involving a 30
year marriage where the recipient spouse had no income and was
caring for an adult disabled child]).

-5-

Clearly, the Jones/Rasband/Howell profile relates more to
the duration of alimony than to any perceived "equalization"
mandate.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff here does not fit the

profile.

She is educated, was employed for substantial periods

throughout the marriage, and is employable at significant
earnings (albeit less than the Defendant's) at the time of trial.
In such a case, the principal and standard set down in Thronson
v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) would appear more
equitable.

In that case, even through the paying spouse had

income of more than three times the receiving spouse, the Court
did not suggest equalization of the incomes.

The principal is,

simply, just because the paying spouse has more income does not
justify in and of itself any increased payment to the receiving
spouse absent a showing of need.
POINT III.
THE COURT RELIED UPON AN INAPPROPRIATE
RATIONALE IN DETERMINING THE APPRECIATION ON
THE HUSBAND'S OTHERWISE SEPARATE
(INHERITANCE) PROPERTY WAS MARITAL.
The Plaintiff suggests that the increased value in the
Defendant's inheritance property should be part of the marital
estate.

The only basis for this is the finding that the

Defendant's corporation paid the Defendant rent that exceeded the
mortgage.
Mrs. Schaumberg admits that the property is separate
property of the Defendant.

For the reasons set out in the

Defendant's principal brief, appreciation on that property should
also be separate property.

The Plaintiff must establish, and
-6-

there must be facts to support the argument that the Plaintiff
contributed to, enhanced, maintained or protected the property in
order to make it marital and subject to the equitable
distribution powers of the court. While the Court can distribute
otherwise separate property within its equitable powers, the
court in this case has chosen not to use those powers, but rather
has based its decision on the theory that the Plaintiff has
contributed to, enhanced maintained or protected the property.
The Plaintiff has ignored one critical fact in analyzing
this issue.

Even though the corporation paid the Defendant rent

that exceeded the mortgage, after paying the mortgage, utilities
and upkeep, the Defendant experienced a "slightly negative cash
flow.ft (emphasis added) (Transcript page 176, lines 19 - 21)
It is logically insufficient to argue that simply because
the corporation pays one of the parties rent, that the property
is commingled and no longer separate.

It must be shown, at

least, that the rent payment is unreasonable, or some such
similar fact to justify the finding of commingling.
such evidence in this case.

There was no

The Defendant owns an office

building which is admittedly separate/inheritance property.
rendered it to his own corporation.

The payments were inadequate

to cover the costs of operating the building.
profit or income.

He

There was no net

It makes no difference, under those

circumstances, whether the building was rented to his own
corporation or some other tenant.

Clearly, the Defendant's own

corporation had to have offices and had to pay rent somewhere.
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Under those circumstances, the same rent would be paid, absent
evidence to the contrary, which was not introduced.

Presumably,

if the Defendant had no financial interest in the tenant, then
where would be no argument about the separate character of the
inheritance property.
The Plaintiff's reliance on the Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), is misplaced.

The Watson case suggested

that assets of the corporation were nevertheless marital assets
for the reasons set out in the Plaintiff's brief.
here, does not dispute that principal.

The Defendant,

The Court properly

exercised its equitable power to divide the corporation and its
assets.

What the Plaintiff attempts to do in this case, is not

allowed under Watson.

The Plaintiff attempts to make an asset a

corporate asset (and therefore a marital asset), when it is not.
In so doing, the Plaintiff attempts to turn Watson "inside out."
The Defendant has never suggested that the inheritance property
was separate for any reason other than the fact that it was
inherited by the Defendant, and the Plaintiff never contributed,
enhanced or protected it.

It is separate property for that

reason, not because the Defendant's corporation was a tenant in
the building.
POINT IV.
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO HER FEES ON
APPEAL.
The Plaintiff was not awarded attorney's fees at trial.
should not be awarded attorney's fees on appeal.
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-8-

She

See Rasband v.

The Plaintiff's

attempted introduction of facts which are not in the record is
objectionable and a flagrant attempt to prejudice the Court.

If

circumstances have come up since the trial of this matter which
would warrant the award of fees, then, at best, that one issue
should be remanded to the Court for further findings and
determination.

To ask this Court to entertain facts which are

not a part of the record is unfair and inequitable.

Inasmuch as

the Plaintiff bases its claim for attorney's fees on a "drastic
change of circumstances" which are not part of the record, those
"changes" as relied upon by the Plaintiff should be stricken from
her brief and ignored by the Court.
While the Defendant will not address each of the
allegations, it should be sufficient to point out that Plaintiff
has failed to take the steps necessary to receive her portion of
the military retainer pay which was awarded to her.

For tax

reasons, the Plaintiff would rather have the money paid to the
Defendant and require him to pay over one-half thereof.

This is

not what the Court contemplated and constitutes simple
manipulation by the Plaintiff.2
CONCLUSION
The record in this case demands that the Court make a ruling
regarding the Plaintiff's needs. Nothing in this case relieves
the Court from that responsibility.

In analyzing the income

available to the receiving spouse, the Court should consider all

As a matter of fact, that issue has been addressed by the trial court
already and resolved, presumably, to the satisfaction of all the parties.
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sources.

The basis for ruling that the appreciation on otherwise

separate property has been somehow commingled is erroneous.

The

Plaintiff should not be awarded fees for this appeal.
The matter should be remanded to the trial court for
adequate findings and with instructions to consider all sources
of income available to the receiving spouse.

The Defendant

should be awarded his entire interest in his separate/inheritance
property.
DATED THIS

l^Q

day of June, 1993.
GREEN & BERRY

FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
COMES NOW Frederick N. Green, attorney for
Defendant/Appellant in the above-entitled action, and hereby
certifies that he has served Kent T. Yano with four (4) copies of
the Reply Brief of the Appellant by mailing true and correct
copies thereof to Kent T. Yano, attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee,
2225 East Murray Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, Utah
this

|Q

84117, on

day of June, 1993.
GREEN & BERRY

L l V . VI/UV^

FREDERICK N. GREEN
attorney for Defendant/Appellants
S-317-91\Brief.P12
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